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ABSTRACT
A n Analysis of Wealth Effect to Shareholders of the
Lodging Industry in Mergers and Acquisitions
by
Sung-Hwan Kim
D r . Skip Swerdlow, Examination Chair
Professor of Hotel Administration
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

This study originated from the question of whether
additional wealth gains from merger and acquisition
activities accrued to shareholders of both acquiring and
target hotel firms since there is no enough evidence
related to the hospitality industry.
The result indicated that corporate takeovers generate,
on average,

significant positive additional gains to

shareholders of acquiring firms of non-casino hotel firms
and shareholders of target firms of both non-casino and
casino hotel firms. Shareholders of acquiring firms of no n
casino hotel firms, on the other hand, earn "normal"

111
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returns from the takeover proposals. Furthermore,
results showed

the

.hat there is a difference in the size of

additional gains between acquiring firms of non-casino
hotel and casino hotel firms, and that there is a
difference in size of additional gains between target firms
of non-casino hotel and casino hotel firms.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
Mergers and acquisitions are currently a popular form
of corporate expansion and growth. Mergers and acquisitions
are popular because they can be used to access to
additional human and physical resources,

increase a

company’s brand awareness, consolidate wealth,

enhance

profit making opportunities and consolidate power to make
further profits possible. The objective of a merger and an
acquisition is to obtain control of the human and physical
resources of the target firm and to utilize these resources
to maximize the shareholders' wealth through a merger and
an acquisition aimed at creating sustainable competitive
advantages for the acquirer.
Since in the hospitality industry markets have become
saturated, making new construction unfeasible in many
locations, hospitality firms are increasingly turning to
mergers and acquisitions as a means to sustain growth.
According to Cook Jr.

(1997), as valuations for lodging

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

2

companies are relatively high and capital availability is
strong, corporate mergers and acquisitions have been an
effective mechanism for improving a company's profile and
achieving growth quickly. This activity is expected to
continue in the future.
From the early 1990s,

the lodging industry has used

the mergers and acquisitions as an effective mechanism for
corporate expansion and growth. Table 1 provides a summary
of merger and acquisition activities between 1992 and 1999
by hotel and casino industry. Table 1 shows that after 1995
the value of merger and acquisition deals has dramatically
increased as well as the number of the deals. Especially,
in 1997 there were 220 merger and acquisition deals
collectively valued more than $ 26.67 billion and in 1998
there were 189 merger and acquisition deals collectively
valued more than $ 34.85 billion.
Numerous studies have been conducted to investigate
whether additional wealth gains from mergers and
acquisitions accrued to the shareholders. Many studies have
reached three often conflicting conclusions:

1) target

shareholders earn significantly positive abnormal returns
from all acquisitions, and 2) acquiring shareholders earn
negative abnormal return from mergers, and 3) acquiring
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shareholders earn little or no abnormal returns from tender
offers

(Dodd and Ruback,

1978; Dodd,

1977; Kummer and Hoffmeister,

1980; Asquith,

1983; Jensen and Ruback,
and Vijh,

1983 ; Bradley, Desai, and Kim,

1983; Malatesta,

1997) .

Several other studies (Wansley,
Travlos,

1983 ; Loughran

1987 ; Asquith,

Lane, and Yang,

Bruner, and Mullins,

1991; Peterson and Peterson,

1987;

1987; Servqes,

1991) have been conducted to

determine the impact on bidding firms ' stock returns
depending on the choice of method of payment for mergers
and acquisitions. They found negative abnormal returns in
stock offers and no abnormal returns in cash offers. On the
other hand, some other studies (Wruck,
Smith,

1993; Chang,

1998)

1989 ; Hertzel and

found no abnormal returns in cash

offers but positive abnormal returns in stock offers.
Most previous studies focused on multiple industries
or single non-hospitality industry as the sample. The
lodging industry is, however, substantially different from
many other non-lodging industries due to high stock
volatility,

strong capital availability and fixed asset

intensive. This study, based on the market model
(Fama,1969) utilizes empirical evidence of both acquiring
and target firms of non-casino and casino hotels as to
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investigate whether shareholders in the lodging industry
gain additional wealth from mergers and acquisitions.

Table 1.
Merger and Acquisition Activities by Hotel and Casino
Industry from 1992 to 1999.

1992

Value of Deals
($million)
748 .5

The Number of
Deals
22

1993

2,081.1

44

1994

2,701.4

80

1995

4,598.1

93

1996

11,104.2

166

1997

26,679.0

220

1998

34,850.0

189

Year

1999
87
13,504.0
Note : The data was obtained from each y e a r 's Mergers &
Acquisitions from 1992 - 1999.

The Statement of the Problem
The previous empirical studies that investigated the
shareholder wealth effects have found that shareholders
gain positive additional wealth as a result of mergers and
acquisitions. There is enough evidence, however,

to suggest

that the wealth effects of acquisitions are not homogeneous
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across all transactions, and the different wealth effects
are the results of different factors that are unique to the
transaction (Kwansa, 1994). This study will focus on n on 
casino hotels and casino hotels with the intention of
providing empirical evidence as to whether shareholders in
the lodging industry earn significant additional wealth as
a result of mergers and acquisitions. Therefore,

the

questions raised for answer in this study are:
1.

Do the shareholders of acquiring firms earn
significant additional wealth created in the
event of a takeover?

2.

Do the shareholders of target firms

earn

significant additional wealth created in the
event of a takeover?
3.

Is there any significant difference

between

the size of abnormal returns to acquiring
firms of non-casino hotels compared to the
size of abnormal returns to acquiring firms of
casino hotels?
4.

Is there any significant difference

between

the size of abnormal returns to target firms
of non-casino hotels compared to the size of
abnormal returns to target firms of casino
hotels?

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Justification of the Study
Previous empirical studies that investigated the size
shareholder wealth effects have concentrated on multiple
industries or single non-hospitality industry that have
large asset values, expect for the study conducted by
Kwansa (1994). Kwansa utilized hotel and restaurant firms
as a sample and examined the size of shareholder wealth
accruing to shareholders. In comparison,

this study focuses

on non-casino hotels and casino hotels and provides
empirical evidence to investigate the size of shareholder
wealth accruing to shareholders in the non-casino and
casino hotel firms.
The lodging industry is different from other
manufacturing industry because of high rate of real estate
assets and intangible assets such as management intensive
and franchise affiliation. Ambrose

(1990) examined

relationship between real estate assets and corporate
takeover probability and showed that real estate asset is
an important factor in the corporate takeover. Also,
previous studies indicated that the valuation of real
estate stock is significantly different from the valuation
of common stock (Fogler, 1984; Firstenberg,
Zisler,

1988; Kaplin and Schwarz,

Ross, and

1988). The additional

shareholder wealth created for lodging firms,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

therefore.

7

will be different from the shareholder wealth created for
non-lodging firms.
Empirical studies in the area of shareholder wealth
effects of takeover assume that stocks of firms within the
same industry are homogeneous. Schmalensee (1985), however,
investigated industry effects and found that industry
effects exist and are important. Kwansa

(1994) also found

that the size of shareholder wealth gains between hotel and
restaurant industry is significantly different. These
findings suggest that stocks of non-casino hotel and casino
hotel firms are heterogeneous and valuation of its sector's
stock will be different because of different market
reaction to a certain event. As a result,

the size of

shareholder wealth gains from takeover proposal between two
groups is different because of its own characteristics and
unique business environment such as higher barriers for
entering into the casino industry.
This study attempts the first to investigate the size
of the shareholders wealth effects for the acquiring firms
in the lodging industry. Moreover,

this study is the first

attempt focusing on casino hotel firms. This study
introduces and attempts to answer the unanswered question
of whether shareholder of both acquiring and target firms
in the lodging industry earn significant additional wealth
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effects as a result of the proposals of the mergers and
acquisitions.

Research Hypotheses
Based on the statement of the problems mentioned
previously,

the hypotheses of this study originated from

the unanswered question of whether the shareholders of each
acquiring and target firms of non-casino and casino hotels
earn significant positive additional gain as a result of
the proposals of mergers and acquisitions. The rejection of
the null hypothesis will imply that shareholders of each
acquiring and target firms of non-casino and casino hotels
experience significant positive wealth effects as a result
of the proposals of mergers and acquisitions.
Null Hypothesis 1:
There is no significant difference in the size of
additional shareholder wealth gained by shareholders of
acquiring firms in the event of a takeover.
Null Hypothesis 2:
There is no significant difference in the size of
additional shareholder wealth gained by shareholders of
target firms in the event of a takeover.
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Null Hypothesis 3 :
There is no significant difference between the size of
abnormal returns to acquiring firms of non-casino hotels
compared to the size of abnormal returns to acquiring firms
of casino hotels.
Null Hypothesis 4:
There is no significant difference between the size of
abnormal returns to target firms of non-casino hotels
compared to the size of abnormal returns to target firms of
casino hotels.

Delimitation of the Study
The scope of this study is delimited as follow:
1. The casino hotel is defined as a hotel whose
primary source of revenue is gaming and where lodging
accommodations are provided. The non-casino hotel is
defined as a hotel whose primary source of revenue is
lodging accommodations.
2. This study focuses only on the lodging industry,
non-casino hotels and casino hotels. The additional
shareholder wealth of other hospitality sectors, such as
the restaurant sector is excluded from the study due to
different capital structure and assets structure.
Valuation of real estate assets for the lodging industry is

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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different from the valuation of financial assets in other
hospitality sectors.
3.

This study focuses on both target and acquiring

firms that are publicly owned. The additional shareholder
wealth of privately held firms is excluded from the study
because of poor information availability.

Limitations of the Study
This study will have the following limitations :
1. The samples used in the study are limited to the
lodging firms

(casino hotels and non-casino hotels)

which have to be publicly traded,

for

listed on the New York

Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange (NYSE/AMEX)
and the National Association of Securities Dealers
Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ) over the period from
1990 through 1999, and for which daily stock returns were
on the Center for Research in Security Prices

(CRSP) tape

because the data is available in readily usable form.
2. The impacts of special corporate events, such as
announcement of dividend increase and major management or
financial reorganization, are not considered in the study
due to elimination of other side effects.
3. This study only considers merger and acquisition
activities from 1990 to 1999.
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Definition of Terms
1. Abnormal returns
abnormal returns

(or residuals): The term The

(or residuals)

is defined as the

difference between the stock return at any time and the
predicted stock return.
2. Acquiring firm: A firm that has made an offer to
take over another firm.
3. Acquisition: An activity that one firm purchases
the assets or shares of another firm, and the acquired
firm's shareholders ceases to be owners of that firm. The
words merger and acquisition are often treated synonymously.
4. Casino hotel : A hotel whose primary source of
revenue is casino gaming including table games and slot
machines, where lodging accommodations are provided.
5. Cumulative abnormal return (CAR): The sum of
differences between the expected return on a stock and the
actual return that comes from the release of new
information to the financial market.
6. Event study: A statistical study that examines how
the release of information affects prices at a particular
time. Event studies in finance measure stock performance
after subtracting a benchmark return based on beta risk
7. Merger: An agreement to combine two or more
corporations to form one economic unit under procedures
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established by the state of incorporation of each
corporation (Kuhn, 1990) .
8. Market model : A one-factor model for returns where
the index that is used for factor is an index of the
returns on the whole market. The market returns are
considered to reflect the effects of all the underlying
factors that affect in the market.

(Kwansa,

1994)

9. Non-casino hote l : A hotel whose primary source of
revenue is lodging accommodation without casino facilities.
10. Spin-off : A form of corporate restructuring in
which a parent firm becomes smaller. In spin-off the
business unit is not sold for cash or securities. Rather
common stock in the unit is distributed to the shareholders
of the company on a pro rata basis, after which the
operation becomes a completely separate company with its
own traded stock.

(Van Horne,

1998)

11. Takeover : General term referring to transfer of
control of a firm from one group of shareholders. A
takeover is similar to an acquisition and also implies that
the acquirer is much larger than the acquired.
12. Target firm: A firm that is the object of a
takeover by another firm.
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13. Tender offer: An offer to purchase or exchange
shares of stock of another company at a fixed price per
share from stockholders who tender their s hare.
14. The Center for Research in Security Price (CRSP)
Files : CRSP provides monthly, quarterly, or annual updates
of end-of-day and month-end prices on all listed on the N ew
York Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange
(NYSE/AMEX) and the National Association of Securities
Dealers Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ) common stocks
with the basic market indices.
15. The event day (or the announcement d a y ) : It is the
day that the announcement of an acquisition proposal is
appeared on the Wall Street Journal or day after the
announcement appears on the Dow Jones newswire.

Organization of the Study
This study is designed to investigate whether
shareholders in the lodging industry earn significant
additional wealth as a result of mergers and acquisitions.
Chapter 2 provides a review of previous literature on the
shareholder wealth effects of mergers and acquisitions.
Chapter 3 is a description of the sampling and data
collection procedures and the research methodology employed
in this study. Chapter 4 reports the findings of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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empirical investigation and analyzes the results. Finally
chapter 5 summarizes the results of the tests, and the
conclusion. Suggestions for future research are also
presented.
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CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Introduction
Previous empirical studies have found shareholders, on
average, gain positive additional wealth from acquisitions.
The wealth effects of acquisitions, however,

are not

homogeneous across all transactions and the different
wealth effects are created by different unique transaction
factors. Most empirical studies have focused on industries
other than the hospitality industry, which has special
characteristics,

such as being intangible/fixed asset

intensive and labor/service oriented. Moreover,

there is

little hospitality literature related to this study.
Therefore, a study of the wealth effects of acquisitions in
the hospitality industry appears to be needed.

15
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Shareholder Wealth Effects on
Mergers and Acquisitions
The impact of takeovers on shareholder wealth has been
a constant issue of debate in financial economics. The
empirical evidence indicates that the shareholders of
target firms receive positive economic gains from takeovers
The premiums of the shareholders of target companies from
takeovers have historically exceeded 3 0 percent on average,
and in recent times have averaged about 50 percent
1994). Mergerstat Review (1992)

(Jensen,

showed that the average

premium above market price during the period 1983 through
1992 ranged between 31.5 percent and 40 percent.
The benefit for the shareholders of acqpairing
companies, however,

is ambiguous. A comprehensive review of

empirical evidence has showed that acquiring firms earn
either statistically significant negative abnormal returns
indicating that the shareholders of acquiring firms
experienced significant loss as a result of the takeover
proposals
Poulsen,

(Dodd, 1980; Firth,

1980; Eger, 1983 ; Jarrell and

1989; Raad, Ryan, and Sinkey,

insignificant positive abnormal returns
Eckho,

1983; Dennis and McConnell,

Weinstein,

1999), or
(Asquith,

1983 ;

1986; Ami hud, Dodd, and

1986) around the announcement of the merger
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proposal. Other studies on tender offers,

on the other hand,

have reported that the shareholders of the acquiring firms
gain small significant positive abnormal returns indicating
that the shareholders of the acquiring firms earn
significant additional gain as a result of the takeover
proposals

(Mandelker,

1980; Bradley et al.,
empirical findings,

1974; Dodd and Ruback,
1983; Walker,

1977 ; Bradley,

2000) . These mixed

therefore, make it difficult to

interpret evidence and draw conclusions regarding the
impact of takeover on the shareholders of acquiring firms.
There are two classes of acquisitions theories on
shareholder wealth effects

(Halpern,

1983). The first

theory is the non-value maximizing theory or zero-impact
theory,

that neither the acquiring nor the target company

receives economic gains as a result of an acquisition. Any
positive gains obtained by the target shareholders as an
inducement would be offset by a loss to the acquiring firm
shareholders

(Halpern,

1983). That is, the shareholders of

the target firms would be expected to have positive
abnormal returns either at the first public announcement of
the acquisitions or at the effective date of the
acquisitions. The shareholders of the acquiring firms would
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be expected to have negative abnormal returns over the
entire period.
The second theory is the value maximization or
positive impact theory that the shareholders of both target
and acquiring firms would be expected to have positive
economic gains from the acquisitions. This theory is
supported by three hypotheses : monopoly rent,
internal efficiency (Kwansa,

synergy, and

1994).

The first hypothesis is that takeovers result in
monopoly market power and that monopoly rents are generated
(Ellert,

1976). If monopolistic market power is increased

through a takeover, all companies in the industry should
benefit as the price of products that the industry produces
is increased. The empirical implication, however,

is that

the target and/or bidding firm shareholders benefit from a
takeover, but the hypothesis provides no prediction as to
how the monopoly rents are split to the target and/or
bidding firms (Dodd and Ruback,

1977).

The second hypothesis is that there is a difference
between the combined value of the target and acquiring
firms from a takeover and the sum of the value of each
dependent firm. According to Bradley et al.

(1983), the

value created by the combination may result from more
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efficient management,
production techniques,

economies of scale,

improved

the combination of complementary

resources, the redeployment of assets to more profitable
uses, the exploitation of market power,

or any number of

value-created mechanisms that fall under the general rubric
of corporate synergy. The implication of the synergy
hypothesis is that successful takeovers generate gains to
the firms and unsuccessful offers generate zero or negative
gains to the firms.
Finally,

the internal efficiency hypothesis indicates

that the value of firms can be increased through a change
in management. Jensen and Ruback (1983)

stated that a

takeover generally occurs because changes in technology or
market conditions require a major restructuring of
corporate assets. That is, an acquiring firm is assumed to
be motivated by information about a target firm's
management inefficiency. The announcement of a takeover is
considered to be positive information for the target firm,
and the financial market in turn responds favorably by
increasing the market value of both the target and the
acquiring firm.
The hypotheses reviewed in this section appear to be
reasonable explanations of takeover activity. This study
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will investigate whether zero-impact theory or the positive
impact theory is identified as a result of takeover
proposals.

Previous Empirical Studies on the
Shareholder Wealth Effect
To measure the impact of mergers and acquisitions,
numerous studies have been conducted to determine whether
shareholders of both target and acquiring firms gain
positive abnormal returns accrued from the events. Dodd and
Ruback (1977) used the market model to investigate the
impact of tender offers on the returns to shareholders of
both target and bidding firms. Using monthly return data of
172 bidding firms

(124 of successful and 48 of unsuccessful

tender offers) and 172 target firms

(13 6 successful and 3 6

unsuccessful tender offers), they found that target
shareholders of successful tender offers earned 20.58
percent

while those of unsuccessful tender offers earned

18.96 percent abnormal returns. Shareholders of bidding
firms in successful and unsuccessful tender offers, on the
other hand, gained 2.83 percent and 0.58 percent abnormal
retuzms, respectively. Dodd and Ruback,

therefore, rejected

the zero impact hypothesis implying that bidding firms had
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no positive economic gains from takeovers, and accepted the
positive impact hypothesis. That is, the shareholders of
both the target and bidding firms eairn positive economic
gains.
Asquith et al.

(1983) also examined the effect of

mergers on shareholders of bidding firms using a sample of
428 bids from 1963 through 1979. They found that the sample
firms earned 2.8 percent average cumulative excess returns
with a t-statistic of 5.2. Furthermore, after controlling
for the target's size,

for the outcome of the merger bid,

and for the time period in which the bid occurred,

they

found even larger excess returns. Based on their results,
they concluded that mergers provide positive cumulative
abnormal returns for the shareholders of bidding firms.
In a study investigating strategic objectives and
stock performance of acquiring firms. Walker

(2000) used a

sample of 278 acquisitions covering the period from 1980
through 1996. The results of the study supported both the
asymmetric information hypothesis that shareholders of
acquiring firms experience higher returns following cash
offers, and the strategic alignment hypothesis that
shareholders of acquiring firms experience higher returns
following takeovers that increase their market share or

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

22
expand their operations geographically. Walker also found
that no competitive gains or strategic advantage over rival
firms accrue to bidding firms.

Walker concluded that the

use of different payment methods and strategic objectives
do not guarantee a positive response by the financial
markets or gains to shareholders of bidding firms
In testing the shareholder wealth effect in the
hospitality industry, Kwansa (1994) investigated the impact
of acquisitions on shareholders of hospitality firms.
Before Kwansa's study, most acquisition studies in the
hospitality industry were descriptive in nature and few
industry-specific studies had been conducted. Using a
sample of 39 restaurant and 18 hotel target firms between
1980 and 1990 and the market model, Kwansa obtained average
abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for the
shareholders of the target restaurant and hotel firms. The
results of the study indicated that shareholders of both
target restaurant and hotel firms gained 29.8 percent and
8.86 percent cumulative abnormal returns over a period of
3 0 days before and after the announcement of the
acquisitions,

respectively. The evidence also showed a

significant difference in the size of excess returns
between the target restaurant and hotel companies. Kwansa
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concluded that the stock market is efficient in valuing
stocks of hospitality companies. That is, contrary to the
perception that hospitality firms' stocks are undervalued
because of real estate factors,

stock returns of

hospitality firms are similar to those of firms in other
industries.
Other studies offer evidence that acquiring firms
experience negative abnormal returns or zero/small abnormal
returns that are not statistically significant. Asquith
(1983) examined the abnormal stock returns of both
successful and unsuccessful merger bids in order to
investigate the effect of merger bids on stock returns.
Both successful and unsuccessful target firms showed,
average,

on

significant positive abnormal returns on the

announcement day and the day before. However, there were
significant positive abnormal returns to successful target
firms and significant negative abnormal returns to
unsuccessful target firms on the outcome date; that is, the
day that the outcome of a merger bid is reported in The
Wall Street Journal. Both successful and unsuccessful
bidding firms, on the other hand,

exhibited small positive

excess returns that were statistically insignificant on the
announcement day and the day before. On the outcome date.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

24

both, firms' returns were statistically insignificant.
Asquith concluded that abnormal returns occur throughout
the period from the press date to the outcome date as new
information is released, and that the increases in the
probability of merger should cause the stock, price of both
acquiring and target firms to adjust in one direction and
the decreases in the probability of merger should cause
price of both acquiring and target firms to adjust in the
opposite direction.
Bradley et al.

(1988) conducted an empirical analysis

of synergistic gains using the revaluation of 23 6 samples
of tender offers. Daily abnormal returns of both target and
acquiring firms were obtained by the market model using
with daily stock returns. The average gain represented a
7.4 percent increase in the combined wealth accrued to
shareholders of target and acquiring firms. The authors
also found that the gains of target shareholders were
significant and had increased since che William Amendment
in 1968. Shareholders of acquiring firms,

on the other hand,

experienced positive gain during 1963-1968, but had
suffered a significant loss during 1981-1984. In addition,
the authors found that competition among bidding firms
increased the returns to target firms and decreased the
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returns to bidding firms. Moreover,

total abnormal returns

in multiple-bidder acquisitions were higher. That is, the
targets of multiple-bidder acquisitions enjoy higher
abnormal returns not only at the expense of shareholders of
acquiring firms but from the greater synergistic gains that
accompany these transactions.
Raad et al.,
leverage,

(1999)

focused on the joint effects of

ownership structure, and relative size on the

excess returns to both target and acquiring firms. Based on
a sample of 81 target firms and 81 acquiring firms in
successful takeovers occurring between 1980 and 1990,
found that takeovers provided,

they

on average, positive excess

returns to target firms and negative excess returns to
acquiring firms. The results of the study also showed a
significant positive relationship between the debt ratios
of target firms and excess returns to shareholders of
target firms, and a negative relationship between the debt
ratios of target firms and excess returns to shareholders
of acquiring firms. In addition, neither the ownership
structure of target firms nor the size of target firms had
any significant effect on the gains accruing to
shareholders of either target or acquiring firms. The
authors concluded that the capital structure of target
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firms affects the allocation of excess gains between
targets and acquirers.
In conclusion, based on the previous studies it is
clear that target firms enjoy substantial economic gains in
takeovers. However,

for acquiring firms, the evidence is

inconclusive, as the empirical findings make it difficult
to interpret existing evidence and to draw conclusions.
Also most empirical studies have focused on multiple
industries or single non-hospitality industry expect for
the study conducted by Kwansa

(1994) who examined the

impact of acquisitions on the shareholders of hotel and
restaurant target firms. The literature review,

therefore,

reveals that there are not enough empirical findings
regarding the impact of acquisitions on the shareholders in
the lodging industry. Moreover,

Kwansa (1994) only

concentrated on target firms of hotel and restaurant. As a
result,

this study that attempts to investigate whether the

shareholders of each acquiring and target firms of non
casino and casino firms earn any additional gains from the
takeover proposals is needed to provide evidence on this
matter for the lodging industry.
Jensen and Ruback (1983) reviewed literature on
corporate takeovers and presented evidence of abnormal

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

27

returns associated with tender offers and mergers, and
post-outcome abnormal returns associated with tender offers
and mergers. Tables 2 and 3 provide a summary of literature
on tender offers and mergers. In addition, Jarrell and
Poulsen (1987) reported an apparent time dependency in the
stock market reaction to tender offers between 1962 and
1986. Table 4 summarizes the excess returns to acquiring
firms .
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ssful (%)
(%)
-7.20
(196, -4.10)

-9.60
(89, -5.41)
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ssful (%)
(%)
n.a.

-8.7
(91, -2.11)

-2.90
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n.a.
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n.a.
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1970
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n.a.
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n.a.

n.a.

CD

(
(/
/)
)
n.a. = Not Available
Source: Jensen and Ruback (1983)

w
u»

34

Table 4.
Cumulative Excess Returns to Successful Bidders
for Tender Offers During 1960 to 1985, by Decade.
Trading-day Interval

All

1960s

1970s

1980s

-10 to +5
(t stat.)

1.14
(2.49)

4 .40
(4.02)

1.22
(2.12)

-1.10
(-1.54)

-10 to +20
(t stat.)

2.04
(3.31)

4.95
(3.52)

2.21
(2.87)

-0 .04
(-0.04)

405

106

140

159

Number of observation

Source: Jarrell and Poulsen (1987)

The Market Model and Its Empirical Application
Most empirical research involving the impact of
mergers and acquisitions on shareholder returns has used
the market model. The market model is popular because it
does not assume that all covariance between stocks is due
to common covariance with the market, and therefore it does
not lead to the simple expression of portfolio risk that
arises under the single-index model

(Elton and Gruber,

1995). However, according to Sullivan (1989), the accuracy
of estimated wealth effects depends on the correctness of
the assumed return generating model used to estimate these
wealth effects and the appropriateness of the market
parameters estimated by the model.
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The response of the financial market to a takeover bid
can be measured using daily stock return data that show
abnormal shareholder returns. Such returns measure the
effect of the new information becoming accessible to the
public. Therefore,

the estimate of the abnormal returns

created by a takeover is based on the market model
prediction error when the takeover is announced to the
public. On the assumption that stock returns are
distributed in a multi-variate normal manner,
return (prediction error)

the abnormal

is estimated by the following

market m o de l :

where

= rate of return of security i over period t, R^^

= rate of return on a value weighted market portfolio over
period t, and a^, b^ = market model parameter estimates.
The abnormal return (AR^^)

to firm i on day t can be

written as:
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The abnormal return for security i is calculated as
the difference between the actual return of the security
and the return of its control portfolio. The b^
coefficient)

(slope

can be interpreted as a measure of the

systematic risk of security i and indicates the degree to
which security i responds to changes in the return provided
by the overall market. The random disturbance term,

is

interpreted as a measure of the abnormal returns to the
shareholders of firm i for period t. It is an abnormal
return in the sense that it represents the deviation of the
return on a security from its expected return, given the
return earned by the market index during that period (Dodd,
1980). This disturbance is captured as the economic impact
of an economic event such as a takeover proposal when a
firm is exposed by the event. The implication of the market
model, and especially the disturbance

(or residual)

term,

has been the main focus of testing market efficiency
generally and characteristics of market equilibrium
specifically (Kwansa, 1994) .
A study done by Fama, Fisher, Jensen,

and Roll

(1969)

was the first to use the market model to test the
adjustment of stock prices to new information about stock
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splits. The authors' residual analysis technique has been
used in later studies on the effect of takeovers.
Dodd and Ruback (1977) studied the stock market
reaction to both target and bidding firms involved in
successful and unsuccessful tender offers. Dodd and Ruback
used the market model over the pre- and post-event period
and a sample of 344 tender offers listed on the Center for
Research in Security Prices

(CRSP)

tapes. The event day was

defined as the first public announcement of a tender offer,
and the abnormal return was defined as the average
deviation of the monthly return on securities from their
normal relationship with the market as depicted by the
market model. Since evidence was found of positive abnormal
returns to both target and bidding firms,
rejected the zero theory. However,

the authors

the results of the study

may be biased since Dodd and Ruback excluded 12 months data
on before and after the event month and the announced month.
The number of target firms in the original sample,
therefore, was reduced due to insufficient data.
Bradley et al.

(1988) used the market model and daily

stock return data instead of monthly data to determine
wealth effects accruing to both target and bidding firms.
The authors found that competition among acquiring firms
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increased the returns to target firms and decreased the
returns to bidding firms. Moreover,

total abnormal returns

in multiple-bidder acquisitions were higher. That is,

the

targets of multiple-acquirer acquisitions enjoy higher
abnormal returns not only at the expense of shareholders of
the acquiring firms, but from the greater synergistic gains
that accompany these transactions.
In a study related to the hospitality industry, Kwansa
(1994)

investigated the wealth effect created by

acquisitions in the lodging and restaurant industry,
focusing on lodging and restaurant companies. With a sample
of 18 hotel corporations and 3 9 restaurant corporations
listed on the National Association of Securities Dealers
Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ)

and the New York Stock

Exchange and the American Stock Exchange

(NYSEXAMEX),

Kwansa used the market model and daily stock return data to
estimate stock returns for target firms covering 3 0 days
before and after the announcement of the acquisitions. The
results showed that shareholders of both hotel and
restaurant target firms experienced significant abnormal
returns during acquisitions. Kwansa concluded that the
stock market is efficient in valuing stocks of hospitality
firms.
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Blackburn et a l . also used the market model to
investigate the relationship between acquiring firm control
structures and payment method. Abnormal returns were
calculated by using 255 daily stock returns,

ending one

year before the public announcement of the acquisition. The
authors estimated abnormal returns using 5 days before the
offer announcement through the announcement day, and also
used the standard event study method to specify abnormal
returns to shareholders attributable to the announcement of
acquisitions. The results supported the notion that a
disparate outcome of mergers cannot be determined without
consideration of the corporate control structure and the
motivation for the payment method decision.
Previous empirical studies used the market model to
investigate the impact of takeover on shareholder wealth.
Therefore,
model,

this study will use the same model,

the market

to estimate and examine the shareholders wealth

effect of both acquiring and target firms in the lodging
industry.

Summary
Previous studies have provided clear evidence that
shareholders of target firms enjoy the additional wealth
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gain as a result of the takeover proposals. However,

for

acquiring firms, the evidence is inconclusive. Empirical
findings make it difficult to interpret existing evidence
and to draw conclusions. Moreover,

literature review shows

that most previous empirical studies focused on multiple
industries or single non-hospitality industry expect for
the study conducted by Kwansa

(1994) who examined the

impact of acquisitions on the shareholders of hotels and
restaurants target firms. The literature review,

therefore,

reveals that there are not enough empirical findings
regarding the impact of acquisitions on the shareholders in
the lodging industry. Moreover,

Kwansa (1994) only

concentrated on target firms of hotels and restaurants. As
a result,

there is no evidence on the shareholder wealth

effect on both the shareholders of acquiring firms in the
lodging industry and especially no findings for the
shareholders of both acquiring and target firms of casino
hotels. This study that will be the first attempts to
investigate whether the shareholders of both acquiring and
target firms of non-casino and casino firms earn any
additional gains from the takeover proposals is needed to
provide evidence on this matter for the lodging industry.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

41

The literature review also showed that the studies on
the shareholders wealth effect used the market model
developed by Fama (1969)

to examine the impact of the

takeover proposals. Therefore,
model,

the market model,

this study will use the same

to investigate whether the

shareholders of both acquiring and target firms of non
casino and casino hotels.
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CHAPTER 3

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

Introduction
This chapter explains the research methodology used in
this study and consists of four parts : (1) research
objective,

(2) sampling and data collection procedures,

(3)

research method, and (4) hypothesis testing.

Research Objective
The primary

research objective

investigate the impact of takeovers

of this study is to
on shareholder wealth

in the hospitality industry, especially concentrating on
casino and non-casino hotels by using the market model.
Since there are few empirical studies in the hospitality
industry related

to this subject, this investigation

provides insight

into the takeovers

in the hospitality

industry. More specifically, no empirical studies have
focused on the impact of takeovers in the casino industry.

42
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This study is therefore the first empirical study of
the impact of takeovers in the casino industry. The
objective will be achieved by collecting relevant data on
both acquiring and target firms in the casino and lodging
industry,

interpreting the collected data, and analyzing

results using the research method that will be described
later in this chapter. The results and findings of the
study will be presented in Chapter 4.

Sampling and Data Collection Procedures
This study examines a sample of public announcements
of takeover proposals in the lodging industry covering the
period from 1990 through 1999. The sample of casino and
non-casino hotel firms used for this study was drawn from
the lodging and casino industry, defined by either the
firm's two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
code (70 for the lodging industry and 79 for the casino
industry), or by its five-digit North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS) code

(72111 for non-casino

hotels and motels and 72112 for casino hotels). To narrow
the range of the sample, non-casino hotels were limited to
those with 7011 SIC codes or 72111 NAICS codes, and casino
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hotels were limited to those with 7990 primary SIC codes
and 7011 secondary SIC codes, or 72112 NAICS codes.
The choice of the lodging industry was made due to the
author's personal interest in the industry, and the
increase in the number and value of deals in this industry
compared to other hospitality sectors. Since the lodging
industry has reached the mature stage of its business cycle,
and valuations for lodging companies and capital
availability are relatively high, a takeover strategy has
been an effective mechanism for restructuring assets and
achieving fast market expansion.
Firms with small capitalization were excluded from the
sample in order to avoid a size effect. Generally firms
with small capitalization receive higher and positive
impact of takeovers than those with larger capitalization
do. Firms with other significant corporate events
surrounding the announcement date of a takeover proposal
were also excluded. Such events include an announcement of
a dividend increase, a chief executive officer

(CEO)

resignation, a common stock repurchase, a new offering of
securities, and a large new contract. Finally, both casino
and non-casino hotel firms were required to be publicly
traded and listed on the New York Stock Exchange and the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

45

American Stock Exchange

(NYSE/AMEX) or on the National

Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation
System (NASDAQ).
For this study,
residuals)

the term,

"The abnormal return

(or

for each stock" is defined as the difference

between the stock return at any time and the expected stock
return. The expected stock return is measured conditional
on the realized return on a market index to take account of
the influence of marketwide events on the returns of
individual securities

(Jensen and Ruback 1983). The price

of stock is reflected all available information on the
certain stock and the market at any point in time and are,
also, evaluated by all available information at any time by
all investors. That is, the abnormal return is assumed to
be non-normally distributed around zero.

The Term,

"the

daily average abnormal return" is defined as the mean of
each stock's abnormal return. The term,

"the average

cumulative abnormal returns are also defined as the sum of
the average abnormal returns over the interval. For this
study the event interval is t = -2 through t = +2. In this
study,

the daily average abnormal returns and daily

cumulative abnormal returns are assessed to test the
statistical significance. If a firm experiences significant
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positive abnormal returns as a result of a takeover
proposal,

the firm earns additional gains from the proposal

A firm, on the other hand, experiences significant negative
returns,

the firm earns losses from the proposal. To

measure the abnormal returns of casino and non-casino hotel
firms in response to each takeover announcement, an initial
list of 966 stock distributions that took place over the
period from 1990 through 1999 was identified from 1990-1999
Mergers & Acquisitions Rosters and Bear Stearns' Gaming
Intelligence Reports

(1998, June 22 - July 6; 2000, May 8 -

May 22). This period was selected because the increase in
the value of deals and the number of deals was relatively
significant compared to previous periods. The announcement
date of takeover proposals is the date of the first public
announcement of the offer in the Wall Street Journal
From the initial sample of 966,

(WSJ).

transactions were

eliminated if they did not satisfy the following criteria:
(1)

Acquiring and target hotel firms' common
stock traded on NYSE/AMEX or N A S D A Q .

(2)

Daily stock returns of acquiring and target
hotel firms were contained in the Center for
Research in Security Prices

(CRSP)

the CRSP NASDAQ file.
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(3)

Stock return data was available for at least
210 days prior to the takeover announcement.

(4)

The date of the first public announcement of
the takeover proposal and were identifiable.

(5)

No other significant corporate events
regarding the firm were reported in the Wall
Street Journal

(WSJ)

index in the two days

before and after the announcement date.
(6)

A deal was valued at $10 million or more.

Major spin-off deals in the lodging industry such as
the announcement that Hilton Corporation acquired one of
divisions of Starwood Hotels & Resorts

(Caesars World Inc.)

included as the sample in order to increase the sample size,
Some firms in the sample were also used more than one time
with different time frame, at least one and half year
difference from previous deal to increase the sample size.
The final sample consisted of 142 takeover proposals with
57 acquiring non-casino hotel stock portfolios and 30
acquiring casino hotel stock portfolios, and 30 target non
casino hotel stock portfolios and 25 target casino hotel
stock portfolios. Tables 5 and 6 provide the lists of
sample non-casino and casino hotel firms.
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Table 5.

List of Non-Casino Hotel Firms in Sample,

Acquiring Firms

Target Firms

Amerihost Properties Inc.

Amerihost Properties Inc.

Bass PLC.

Bass PLC.

Bridgestreet Accommodations Inc.

Boca Raton Resort & Club.

Bristol Hotel CO.

Boykin Lodging C o .

Capstar Hotel Inc.

Bristol Hotel Co.

Double Tree Hotel Corp.

Courtyard Hotels.

Equity Inns Inc.

Double Tree Hotel Corp.

Extended Stay America Inc.

Equity Inns Inc.

FelCor Lodging Trust Inc.

HFS Inc.

HFS Inc.

Homestead Village Inc.

Hilton Hotels Corp.

Host Marriott Corp.

Hospitality Properties Trust.

Interstate Hotels Corp.

Host Marriott Corp.

ITT Corp.

Hudson Hotels Corp.

La Quinta Motor Inns Inc.

Interstate Hotel Corp.

Marriott Corp.

La Quinta Inns Inc.

PHH Corp.

Lodgian Inc.

Prime Hospitality Corp.

Marriott International Inc.

Prime Motor Inns Inc.

Meditrust corp.

Promus Hotel Corp.

Motel 6 LP.

Red Lion Hotels Inc.

Patriot American Hospitality Inc,

Red Lion Inns.

Prime Hospitality Corp.

Renaissance Hotel Group.

Promus Hotel Corp.

RFS Hotel Investor Inc.

RFS Hotel Investors Inc.

Starwood Hotels and Resorts,

Sun International Hotel LTD

Studio Plus Hotel Inc.

Starwood Hotels and Resorts.

United Inns Inc.

Wyndham Hotel Corp.

Westin Hotels & Resorts.

wyndham international.

Inc.

Wyndham Hotel Co.
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Table 6.

List of Casino Hotel Firms in Sample.

Acquiring Firms

Target Firms

Alliance Gaming Corp.

Bally Entertainment Corp.

Ameristar Casinos Inc.

Boomtown Inc.

American Wagering Inc.

Starwood Hotels & Resorts
World Inc.).

Anchor Gaming.
Argosy Gaming C o .
Aztar Corp.
Boomtown Inc.
Boyd Gaming Corp.
Caesars World Inc.
Casino America Inc.
Grand Casino Inc.
Harrah's Entertainment Inc.
Hollywood park Inc.
International Gaming management.
Mandalay Resort Group.
MGM Grand Inc.
Mirage Resort Inc.
Park Place Entertainment Corp.
Sun International Hotels LTD.
Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts Inc.

(Caesars

Casino Magic Corp.
Caesars New Jersey Inc.
Caesars World Inc.
Grand Casinos Inc.
Grand Gaming Corp.
Griffin Gaming & Entertainment Inc.
Harrah's Entertainment Inc.
Harvey Casino Resorts.
Hollywood Park Inc.
Lady Luck Gaming Corp.
MGM Grand Inc.
National Gaming Corp.
Players International Inc.
Primadonna Resorts Inc.
Rio Hotel and Casino Inc.
Showboat Inc.
Station Casinos Inc.
WHG Resort & Casino Inc.
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Research Methodology
To investigate the stock price reaction to the
announcements of takeovers,

the CRSP daily stock returns

file was used to measure the average daily abnormal returns
for each firm in the sample by using the event study
methodology developed by Fama (1969) , and Brown and Warner
(1980 and 1985). Event studies in finance measure stock
performance after subtracting a benchmark return based on
beta risk (Ocana, Pena, and Robles,

1997).

An important issue in an event study is the choice of
the event date (Halpem,

1993). Researchers have chosen

either the first public announcement date of the takeover
or the actual takeover date, so that uncertainty about
success or failure of the takeover has been resolved.
However,

it is difficult to identify changes in abnormal

returns prior to the actual takeover date, because there
may be many other economic activities that influence the
returns of the firm between the first public date and the
actual takeover date. On the other hand,

the choice of the

first public announcement date as the event date allows the
investigation of any differences in the abnormal returns
observed among a prior announcement period, an announcement
period, and a post-effective period. As a result, most
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studies use the first public announcement date as the event
date. This study, therefore,

adopts the first public

announcement date as the event date.
For each security i, the daily rate of return for
security i is calculated using the following market model:

where

= rate of return of security i over period t, R^^

= rate of return on a value weighted market portfolio over
period t, and a^, b^ = market model parameter estimates.
The abnormal return for security i is estimated as :

Previous studies conducted by Mandelker (1974) and
Halpem

(1983) reported that abnormal returns for target

firms are significantly different from zero up to about a
month before the announcement date of the acquisition
proposals. Loderer and Mauer (1986) also argued that the
market model parameter estimates

(a^ and b^^) for acquiring

firms will be biased if the estimation period is confined
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to the period just before the takeover. Consequently,
market model parameter estimates

(a^ and b^)

the

for each

acquiring and target firm are estimated in this study over
the period from t=-210 to t=-10 relative to the event day
(t=0) where the event is the announcement of a takeover
proposal. The daily abnormal return for each firm is
calculated over the interval

(t=-2 to t=+2), which begins

two days prior to the announcement date and ends two days
after the announcement date. The market reaction for the
non-casino and casino hotel firms is measured for two days ;
the day a merger announcement is reported in the Wall
Street Journal

(t=0) and the day before (t=-l). It is

important to note that while day 0 is defined as the date
of announcement there is reason to believe that the
accurate date is in fact day 1 for some firms in the sample
(Dodd, 1980). That is, even though day zero is the date the
acquisition announcement is published in the Wall Street
Journal,

some of announcements information are released to

the press during trading hours the day before and it is
expected in the marked prices of that day (day -1).
For a sample of N securities, an average abnormal
return (AR^) for each day is calculated by:
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ARj. = 1/N

where N = number of securities in a sample and t indexes
days in event t i m e . The average abnormal returns are summed
over various intervals

(t=-2 to t=+2)

average abnormal returns

to obtain cumulative

(CAR^) over the interval of each

day.
If there are no abnormal events that make stock price
movement unusual surrounding the event day,
values of average abnormal returns
average abnormal returns

the expected

(AR^) and cumulative

(CAR^) are zero. Therefore,

significant deviations from zero indicate the financial
market's responses to the announcement of takeover
proposals.

Hypothesis Testing
A t-test is used to test the statistical significance
of average abnormal returns
abnormal returns
(t=-2 to t=+2)

(AR^) and cumulative average

(CAR^) of each sample over the interval

to see whether a takeover generates

shareholder wealth for both acquiring and target hotel
firms. If there is no unusual price movement around the
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announcement date of takeover proposals,
returns

average abnormal

(AR^) and cumulative average abnormal returns

(CARj.) are expected to fluctuate randomly. Therefore,

significant positive or negative average abnormal returns
from zero indicate the financial market's responses to the
takeover announcement.
The following null hypotheses are tested to determine
whether the announcement of takeover proposals and the
method of payment that is used to pay for a takeover have a
significant impact on shareholder wealth in the lodging
industry.
Null hypotheses :
Null hypothesis 1: There is no significant difference
in the size of additional shareholder wealth gained by
shareholders of acquiring firms in the event of a takeover.
Null hypothesis 2: There is no significant difference
in the size of additional shareholder wealth gained by
shareholders of target firms in the event of a takeover.
Null hypothesis 3 : There is no significant difference
between the size of abnormal returns to acquiring firms of
non-casino hotels compared to the size of abnormal returns
to acquiring firms of casino hotels.
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Null hypothesis 4: There is no significant difference
between the size of abnormal returns to target firms of
non-casino hotels compared to the size of abnormal returns
to target firms of casino hotels.

Summary
The primary objective of this study is to answer the
unanswered question of whether the shareholders of
acquiring firms and target firms in the lodging industry
experienced any additional wealth as a result of the
takeover proposals. To do so this study used daily stock
returns of a sample of 87 acquiring firm stock portfolios
and 57 target firm portfolios,

and used the market model

developed by Fama (1969) to estimate abnormal returns and
cumulative abnormal returns of a firm. Using the abnormal
returns and cumulative abnormal returns the t-test was
conducted to test four null hypotheses. The results of the
tests of the null hypotheses will be presented and
discussed in chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 4

RESULTS AND FINDINGS
In chapter 3, the methodology and the data collection
procedure were discussed. In chapter 4, the description of
the test results is presented as follows:
1. The results of data analysis in acquiring firms.
2. The results of data analysis in target firms.
3. The results of differences between acquiring firms
of non-casino hotels and acquiring firms of casino
hotel s .
4. The results of differences between target firms of
non-casino hotels and target firms of casino hotels

Results of Tests of Acquiring Firm
The issue investigated in this section is whether
shareholders of acquiring firms earn any wealth gains as a
result of takeover announcements. Also,

if shareholders of

acquiring firms experience additional gains, this section

56

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

57

investigates the difference in the size of the abnormal
returns between non-casino hotel and casino hotel firms
This section tests the following two null hypotheses:
Null hypothesis 1: There is no significant difference
in the size of additional shareholder wealth gained by
shareholders of acquiring firms in the event of a takeover.
Null hypothesis 3 : There is no significant difference
between the size of abnormal returns to acquiring firms of
non-casino hotels compared to the size of abnormal returns
to acquiring firms of casino hotels.
Table 7 shows the average abnormal stock returns for
acquiring firms for the two day before and after first
public announcement

(day z e ro ) . As shown in Table 7,

announcement of acquisition proposals have a positive
effect on acquiring firms. The daily abnormal return on the
announcement day is 1.01 percent, which is significantly
different from zero at the .01 level

(t = 3 .27). Unlike the

announcement day abnormal returns, pre-announcement days
(t=-2 to t=-l) and post-announcement days

(t=+l to t=+2)

abnormal returns are less than 1 percent each day, which is
not significantly different from zer o .
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Table 7.

Daily Average Abnormal Returns for Acquiring Firms.
Event Day

AR(%)

t-statistic

-2

0.65

2.11

-1

0.61

1.96

0

1.01*

3 .27

+1

-0 .04

-0.15

+2

-0 .17

-0 .54

*Significant at the .01 level
AR = Daily Abnormal Return

Table 8 provides daily cumulative average returns for
the event period,

t=-2 to t= + 2 . Also Table 8 shows two-day

announcement period cumulative daily average returns
measured from day -1 through 0. Two days are necessary
since takeover events never appear in the Wall Street
Journal until the day after they are announced (Asquith et
al.,

1983). For example,

the proper event date is t=-l when

takeover announcement occurs before the stock market closes.
Also,

the proper event day is t=0 when the announcement is

released to public after the stock market closes. Therefore,
it follows that market reactions to the announcement are
represented by the two-day abnormal returns at day -1 and 0.
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Table 8.

Daily Cumulative Average Returns for Acquiring F i r m s .
Event Day

-2 to

+2

-1 to 0

CAR(%)

t-statistic

2.06*

2 .98

1.61*

3 .69

*Significant at the .01 level
CAR = Daily Cumulative Abnormal Return

In the two-day (t=-l to t=0) and five-day (t=-2 to
t=+2) announcement period, cumulative abnormal returns are
1.61 and 2.06 percent respectively, which is significantly
different from zero at the .01 level of significance
to t=0 = 3.69 and t^^_^

^=+2

(

= 2.98). Therefore null

hypothesis 1 is rejected. Based on the results obtained
from the sample,

it is concluded that, on average,

shareholders of acquiring firms experience significant
gains from the proposal.
Table 9 and 10 provide the daily average abnormal
returns and the daily average cumulative abnormal returns
for each sub-group of acquiring firms of non-casino and
casino hotels.
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Ta b l e 9.

Average Abnormal Returns for Acquiring Firms of Non-Casino
and Casino H o t e l s .

Event Day

Non-Casino Hotels

Casino Hotels

AR(%)

t-statistic

AR(%)

t-statistic

-2

0.53

2.01

0.69

1.03

-1

-0 .037

-0 .12

1.8*

2.72

0

0 .41

1.29

2.2*

3.22

+1

0 .19

0.61

-0.49

-0 .74

+2

0.036

0.11

-0.55

-0 .82

*Signifleant at the .0]. level
AR = Daily Abnormal Return

Table 10.
Daily Cumulative Average Returns for Acquiring Firms of
Non-Casino and Casino Hotels.

Event Day

Non-Casino Hotels

Casino Hotels

CAR(%)

t-statistic

CAR(%)

t-statistic

-2 Co +2

0 .37

0.83

3 .98*

4.20

-1 Co 0

1.22

1.75

3 .63*

2 .42

"Significant at the 0.01 level
CAR = Daily Cumulative Abnormal Return
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The results on acquiring firms of non-casino hotel
firms presented in Table 9 and 10 indicate that
shareholders of acquiring firms of non-casino hotels
experience,

on average,

Specifically,

"normal" rate of return.

the announcement day (t=0) abnormal return is

0.41 percent, which is statistically insignificant at
the .01 level of significance

(t = l .29). In addition,

the

two-day (t=-l to t=0) announcement period and the entire
event period (t=-2 to t=+2) cumulative abnormal return are
1.22 and 0.37 percent, respectively, which is also
statistically insignificant

= 1.75 and t^_ ^

to t=+2 ■ 0-83, respectively).
In contrast to the acquiring firms of non-casino
hotels, the results on the acquiring firms of casino hotels
presented in Table 9 and 10 indicate that shareholders of
acquiring firms of casino hotels have positive abnormal
returns, 2.2 percent on the announcement dat e, which is
significantly different from zero at the .01 level
In addition,

(t = 3 .22).

for the two-day (t=-l to t=0) announcement

period and the entire event period (t=-2 to t=0), the
cumulative abnormal returns to shareholders of acquiring
firms of casino-hotels are 3.63 and 3.98 percent,
respectively, which is statistically significant at the .01
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level

c=0 = 2.42 and

c ;

= 4.20

respectively).
To facilitate the comparison of the results between
acquiring firms of non-casino hotels and acquiring firms of
casino hotels,

two-day (t=-l to t=0) announcement period

the cumulative abnormal returns are compared. Over the twoday announcement period,

the mean difference of cumulative

abnormal returns between two groups is -2.41 percent and
the difference is significant at the .01 level

(t=5.01).

The results show that acquiring firms of non-casino hotels
and acquiring firms of casino hotels are evaluated
differently and acquiring firms of casino hotel are more
favored by the investors at the two-day announcement period
of acquisition proposals. Based on the results hypothesis 3
is rejected.

Results of Tests of Target Firm
In this section, a sample of target firms is analyzed
to determine whether there are wealth gains accruing to the
shareholders of target firms from the takeover
announcements.

If there are the wealth gains,

the wealth

gains are also analyzed to determine the difference in the
size of abnormal returns between the non-casino hotels and
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casino hotels. The following two null hypotheses are tested
to show the results.
Null hypothesis 2: There is no significant difference
in the size of additional shareholder wealth gained by
shareholders of target firms in the event of a takeover.
Null hypothesis 4: There is no significant difference
between the size of abnormal returns to target firms of
non-casino hotels compared to the size of abnormal returns
to target firms of casino h o t e l s .
Table 11 presents average abnormal returns for target
firms for each day in the event period,

+2 through — 2 . The

results indicate that announcements of the acquisition
proposals have a positive effect on common stock prices of
target firms.
The abnormal return on the day prior to the first
announcement of the proposal is 5.14 percent, which is
significantly different from zero at the .01 level
(t = l l .02 ) . The abnormal return on the announcement d ay
(t=0) is 5.12 percent, which is also significantly
different from zero at the .01 level

(t=10.9). Moreover,

the two-day (t=-l to t=0) and the entire event period

(t=-2

to t=+2) shown in Table 12 are 10.27 and 11.45 percent.
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respectively, which is significant at the .01 level (t^_
to t=0 = 15.56 and t ^ ^ _ 2

&=+2 =10*97,

respectively).

Table 11.
Daily Average Abnormal Returns for Target Firms.
Event Day

AR(%)

t-statistic

-2

0.72

1.63

-1

5.14*

11.02

0

5.12*

10.9

+1

0.73

1.55

+2

-0.31

-0.66

*Significant at the

.01 level

AR = Daily Abnormal Return

The results show that shareholders of target firms
earn significant positive gains from the acquisition
proposal. Therefore hypothesis 2 is rejected. A rejection
of this null hypothesis supports the idea that the
shareholders of target firms earn significant additional
wealth gains around the takeover announcement date.
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T a ble 12.

Cumulative Daily Average Returns for Target Firms
Event Day

CAR(%)

t-statistic

+2 to -2

11.45*

10.97

-1 to 0

10 .27*

15.55

♦Significant at the . 0 1 level

CAR = Daily Cumulative Abnormal Return

Table 13 and 14 show results for the behavior of the
average daily and cumulative abnormal returns of target
firms of non-casino hotels and casino hotels. As shown in
Table 13 and 14 both target firms of non-casino and casino
hotels experience significant positive abnormal returns on
the two-day announcement period,

5.2 percent

(t=6.15)

and

16.1 percent (t=10.31), respectively, and on the entire
event period,

6.39 percent

(t=4.78) and 17.47 percent

(t=15.02), respectively. Target firms of casino hotels,
however, earn higher abnormal returns than those of n on 
casino hotels. The comparison of two-day announcement
period cumulative between two group shows that there is
significant difference from zero at the .01 level
Therefore, hypothesis 4 is rejected.
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Table 13.

Average Daily Abnormal Returns for Target Firms of NonCasino Hotels and Casino H o t e l s .

Event Day

Non-Casino Hotels

Casino Hotels

AR(%)

tstatistic

AR(%)

tstatistic

-2

0.38

0 .64

1.24

1.64

-1

2.53*

4.23

8.23*

10.87

0

2.67*

4.46

7.87*

10.87

+1

1.57*

2.63

-0.11

-0.15

+2

-0 .76

-1.27

0.24

0.31

♦Significant at the 0.01 level
AR = Daily Abnormal Return

Table 14 .
Cumulative Daily Average Returns for Target Firms of NonCasino Hotels and Casino Hotels.

Event Day

Non-Casino Hotels

Casino Hotels

CAR(%)

tstatistic

CAR(%)

tstatistic

-2 to -1-2

6.39*

4.78

17.47*

15 .02

-1 to 0

5.2*

6.15

16.1*

10 .31

♦Significant at the 0.01 level
CAR = Daily Cumulative Abnormal Return
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The Results of the Cross-Sectional Analysis
This study included the announcements of spin-off in
order to increase the sample size. In this section, crosssection regression was used to investigate whether the
abnormal returns created by spin-off announcements are
significantly different from the abnormal returns created
by takeover announcements. Table 15 reports the results of
the regression test of both acquiring firms and target
firms. The dependent variable is the two-day(t=-l to t=l)
cumulative abnormal returns. For the independent variable,
the dummy variable (dummy = 0 for takeover proposal and
dummy = 1 for spin-off proposal)

is usf»d.

Table 15.
The Results of the Regression Test for Acquiring Firms and
Target Firms : t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Acquiring Firms

Intercept

.019

Dummy = 1 for
spin-off proposal

.00031

Target Firms

(1.79)
(.209)

.101

(2.82)*

.0253

(.497)

Adjusted R2

.011

.014

F- statistic

.43

.247

♦Significant at the .01 level
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The result shown in Table 15 indicates that the
abnormal returns of spin-off used in the study are not
significantly different from the abnormal returns of
takeover. The coefficient of spin-off dummy shows that
abnormal returns of spin-off are positively correlated with
abnormal returns of takeover, which is statistically
insignificant. The results in this section are different
from the results of Allan et al.

(1995)'s study indicating

that abnormal returns of spin-off announcement period are
negatively and significantly correlated with abnormal
returns of acquisition announcement period.

Summary
Results of the study confirm previous well-documented
results
Ruback

(i.e. Bradley, et al.,

(1983), and Jensen and

(1983)) that shareholders of target firms

experienced positive additional wealth gain around the take
over announcement. In contrast to the previous findings for
shareholders of target firms,

the previous findings for

shareholders of acquiring firms are ambiguous. For the
shareholder of acquiring firms, however, the findings are
in line with Mandelker (1974) , Dodd and Ruback (1977) ,
B r a d l e y (1980), and Bradley et al., (1983) who report a
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positive additional wealth gain around the takeover
announcement.
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C H APTER 5

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary and Conclusions
The primary purpose of the study was to investigate
shareholder wealth effects in the lodging industry. Since
previous empirical studies that investigated shareholder
wealth effects have focused on either multiple industries
or single non-hospitality industry,

this study originated

from the question of whether shareholders in the lodging
industry earn significant additional wealth as a result of
mergers and acquisitions. Also,

the literature review

indicated that there are significant additional wealth
gains accruing to the shareholders of target firms around
the takeover announcement date. For the shareholders of
acquiring firms, on the other hands,

the evidence was

ambiguous, and therefore, difficult to interpret existing
evidence and draw conclusions.

70

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

71

In response to the question, a sample of 87 stock
portfolios of acquiring firms and 55 stock portfolios of
target firms were selected over the period from 1990
through 1999 to estimate and examine abnormal returns and
the cumulative abnormal returns. This period was selected
because the increase in the value of takeover deals and the
number of takeover deals were relatively significant
compared to previous periods.
The results of the study show that overall acquiring
firm shareholders do earn significant positive abnormal
returns on the announcement day, as well as significant
positive cumulative abnormal returns around the takeover
announcement

(t=-2 through t=+2).

For non-casino acquiring firms,

shareholders earn, on

average, normal rate of return. For casino acquiring firms,
on the other hands,

shareholders earn positive additional

wealth. The difference between two-day (t=-l to t=0)
cumulative abnormal returns for non-casino hotels and twoday cumulative abnormal returns for casino hotels is
significant at the .01 level.
Shareholders of target firms receive significant
positive additional gains created as a result of takeover
announcements. This result confirms previous well-
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documented results

(i.e. Bradley,

et al.

(1983),and Jensen

and Ruback (1983)). Non-casino hotel firms earn 6.39
percent cumulative abnormal returns over the event period.
Casino hotel firms, on the other hands,

earn 17.49 percent

cumulative abnormal returns, which is about three times
larger than non-casino hotel firms. The difference between
the cumulative abnormal returns for non-casino hotel firms
and the cumulative abnormal returns for casino hotel firms
is also significant at the .01 level. One explanation for
these results is that there are few hotels that can acquire
other firms in the lodging industry. That is, there is less
likelihood of the emergence of multiple bidders for a
target firm. Michel and Shaked (1988), Franks, Harris, and
Mayer

(1988), and Lefanowicz and Robinson (2000)

found

evidence that multiple bidder acquisitions result in higher
acqpiisition returns to target firms. In other words,
less likelihood of the emergence of multiple bidders,

the
the

more likelihood of the increase of returns to acquiring
firms since the acquiring firms can acquire the target at a
lower price. In the casino hotel sector there are fewer
firms that can take over other firms compared to the non
casino hotel sector. That is, there is less likelihood of
the emergence of multiple bidders in the casino hotel
sector. Shareholders of acquiring firms of casino hotel.
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therefore,

earned positive additional gains from the

takeover announcements. Shareholders of acquiring firms of
non-casino firms, on the other hands, experienced "normal"
return. Another reason that may explain the results is
industry-specific management expertise. Lang, Stultz, and
Walking (1989), and Servaes

(1991) suggested Tobin's q is

an important determinant of the size of abnormal returns
around takeover announcements. High q firms are associated
with having more intangible assets,
specific management expertise,

such as industry-

than are lower q firms. They

found that cumulative abnormal returns of acquiring firms
and target firms are larger when the acquiring firm is a
high q firm and the target firm is a low q firm. That is,
the market expects more value to be created when a firm
with good management expertise takes over a firm with poor
management expertise. The difference in the size of
abnormal returns between non-casino hotel and casino hotel
firms may be explained by the same reasons. The casino
industry is generally considered to have higher barriers
for entering into the industry. The barriers include state
agencies' regulations,

intensively competitive markets,

initial high capital requirements,

long development

timelines, and limitations of good geographic locations
(Yuh, 1999). Those barriers make firms in the non-casino
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industry difficult to enter a takeover deal for a casino
hotel. A few firms with g o o d management expertise on the
casino industry,

therefore,

can take over a casino hotel

firm. As a result there is less p o s s i bility for the
emergence of multiple acquirers. That is, an acquirer has
less competition for the takeover and the acquirer requires
less payment for the takeover.

For the casino target firm,

the market react more positively to the takeover because of
the acquiring firm' management expertise.

Little empirical work has been done to investigate the
shareholder wealth effects in the lodging industry. Kwansa
(1994) provided evidence that shareholders of target hotel
earned significant abnormal returns prior and after 3 0 day
of the announcement day. The findings of this study are
consistent with the findings of Kwansa. Also this study
estimates and examines not only stock returns for target
hotel firms but also stock returns for acquiring hotel
firms. Moreover,

this study is the first attempt focusing

on two different characteristic hotels, non-casino hotels
and casino hotels. The findings of this study introduce and
confirm the unanswered question of whether shareholders of
both acquiring firms and target firms in the lodging
industry earn significant additional wealth created as a
result of takeover proposals.
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Recommendations of Future Study
This study has attempted to introduce and answer the
question of whether shareholders of both acquiring firms
and target firms earn additional benefits created as a
result of takeover proposals. The findings in this study
have provided some of evidences and answers, but have also
introduced some other takeover-related questions. The
following

is a list of recommendations for future

questions

that need to be investigated further :

(1)

research

Future research expand test period at least 20
years to increase a sample size. Even though this
study used ten year period (1990 to 1999),

the

study could obtain 142 stock portfolios which is
relatively small compared to previous empirical
studies. One explanation is that many of hotel
firms, especially casino hotels, are not publicly
traded companies. Moreover, due to relatively
small sample size,
an answer

this study failed to provide

to the question of whether there will

be significant difference in the size of
additional wealth created in terms of use in
different payment methods, such as cash offer,
stock exchange offer, or mixed offer.
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(2)

This study only estimated and examined
shareholder wealth effects around the
announcement period. Future research should
attempt to investigate not only short-term
shareholder benefit created from around
announcement date, but also long-term shareholder
benefit created over three year period from the
announcement date to demonstrate the p o s t 
acquisition returns in the context of shareholder
wealth gains from takeover activities. Future
research also investigates the difference in
shareholder wealth gains between the combined
pre-acquisition period and the combined p o s t 
acquisition period.

Recommendations for future study mentioned here will
hopefully provide a guideline and other issues for future
investigation into shareholder wealth effects in takeovers.
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